Monday, April 3, 2017 Organized Crime
Killings Resurge in Mexican Areas Prone to Violence
By Tristan Clavel (InSight
Crime)
Mexico's security strategy for its 50 most violent municipalities has largely failed to bear fruit after six months,
as criminal dynamics are still fueling increasing rates of homicides despite targeted government efforts.
Six months after the launch
of a special security strategy for the 50 most violent municipalities in Mexico, the number of homicides registered between September 2016 and February 2017 increased in 37 of the municipalities in comparison
to the number of murders seen during the same period of the previous year, reported Animal Político on March 27.
At the end of August 2016, President Enrique Peña Nieto said that 42 percent of all homicides in Mexico so far that year were concentrated in just 2 percent of municipalities. This concentration of violence prompted the launch
of a security strategy for the 50 most affected municipalities, with the aim of strengthening social prevention programs and
institutions.
The president also said that state governors and local officials should take greater responsibility in public security,
while assuring continued support from federal forces and announcing plans for greater coordination between federal and local
forces.
But
six months after the announcement, the figures revealed by Animal Político show that homicides decreased in only 12
of the 50 targeted municipalities, and stayed level in one of them. Moreover, of the ten municipalities with the highest increase,
eight saw their homicide rate more than double, including three municipalities where the figure tripled or more.
The municipality with the
largest increase in its homicide rate was Tecomán, in the state of Colima. Due to the nearly 300 percent increase in
murders in the municipality, the federal government sent 500 military police in February 2017 to secure the area. Colima's Security Secretary Francisco Javier Castaño Suárez said the
spiking violence was the result of a war between the Sinaloa Cartel and the Jalisco Cartel - New Generation (CJNG), reported AF Medios.
Last
year, the state of Colima as a whole had already suffered spiking levels of violence, with homicide figures registered in
April 2016 showing a 940 percent increase in comparison to April 2015. As InSight Crime explained, this outbreak of violence was linked to confrontations between the Sinaloa Cartel and the CJNG.
Similarly, confrontations between criminal groups appear to be the source of violence in the two municipalities of the
Chihuahua state, Ciudad Juárez and Chihuahua. However, in those cases the actors driving the violence are more likely
local gangs rather than transnational organizations.
According to El Universal, a local judicial official argued that similar turf wars between local gangs dedicated to microtrafficking may have largely
fueled violence in the port town of Mazatlán, Sinaloa, which suffered a 159 percent increase in homicides. But a media
report from La Jornada argued that the violence in the strategically important area may instead have stemmed from a conflict between the Beltrán
Leyva Organization, allied with the CJNG, and the Sinaloa Cartel.
Unconfirmed
reports in October 2016 also pointed to an offensive by the CJNG against the Sinaloa Cartel in Baja California Sur as being responsible for the violence that has shaken the state's capital La Paz, which saw a 77 percent increase in its homicide rate.
Many of the most violent
municipalities appear in states that have long been some of organized crime's strongest footholds, such as Tamaulipas, where more than 90 percent of homicides are reportedly linked to organized crime.
One of Tamaulipas' two most violent municipalities, Reynosa, is not only located
along the US-Mexico border, but also in the Burgos Basin, Mexico's largest gas field, which means the city provides ample criminal opportunities for drug trafficking and fuel theft.
Reynosa also remains the epicenter of confrontations between rival groups and security elements targeting criminal leaders.
And
in addition to cartel struggles in Tamaulipas, the other violent municipality, Ciudad Victoria, witnessed a local political
transition in mid-2016 that may have also contributed to rising violence, due to possible realignments between criminal groups and corrupt officials.
Similarly, organized crime has long been deeply established in the states of Guerrero
and Michoacán, which appear along with Tamaulipas in the top five most deadly states for deployed military elements. Several municipalities in both states have experienced rising homicides despite the implementation of the government's
50-city strategy.
Michoacán and Guerrero have both also suffered from the ongoing presence of vigilante groups and competing drug cartels that have fought for control
over the states' rich agricultural lands, which are exploited to cultivate poppy and marijuana. Guerrero's State Attorney
General recently admitted that the authorities were powerless against organized crime in the state, which has become the epicenter of Mexico's opium poppy cultivation.
InSight Crime Analysis
The targeted security strategy does appear to have been successful in certain municipalities
such as Acapulco in Guerrero, Monterrey in Nuevo León, and Puebla in the state of the same name. The respective decreases
of roughly 15, 33 and 35 percent in the homicide rates in these municipalities are significant, given that these three areas
have been at the heart of feuds between rival criminal groups vying for control of illicit economies.
But
the few and rather slight security improvements are largely overshadowed by the extreme rise in homicides in numerous municipalities.
And this dynamic serves as a reminder that Mexico's security institutions continue to struggle to rein in violence in areas of states that have traditionally been hotbeds
for organized crime.
See also: Mexico News and Profiles
In October
2016, a report argued that more than half of Mexico's homicides were linked to organize crime. Certain states, such as Baja California Sur, Tamaulipas or Michoacán, not only present very high percentages of organized
crime-related murders, but they are also the location of some of the municipalities with the highest increase in homicide
rates. In addition, and as previously described, recent reports have portrayed various shifts in criminal dynamics in the
most violent aforementioned municipalities. This would suggest that, despite government efforts, evolutions in the criminal
world are still largely responsible for spiking concentrated violence.
Indeed, the 50-city strategy may have been flawed from the start.
Already in September 2016, the special plan was being criticized for being extremely vague with regard to prevention programs,
and for resembling earlier policies whose efficiency -- or lack thereof -- had not been rigorously assessed, according to
experts cited by Animal Político.
For
example, Francisco Rivas, the director of the National Citizen Observatory (Observatorio Nacional Ciudadano), pointed out that many of the municipalities already received substantial federal funding for strengthening security institutions,
without any evaluation of how efficiently the money was spent. And in addition, security expert Alejandro Hope noted that
the policy made no mention of strengthening the Attorney General's Office nor District Attorney offices, which play key
roles in reducing insecurity in the long-term.
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This commentary was first
published in InSight Crime and reposted per a Creative Commons authorization. InSight Crime's objective is to increase
the level of research, analysis and investigation on organized crime in Latin America and the Caribbean. Tristan Clavel
graduated from the London School of Economics with a BSc in History and International Relations. He later studied Defense,
Security and Crisis Management at the Institut des Relations Internationales et Stratégiques in Paris.