November 14, 2005

Calderon offers hope to the Mexican electorate

By William J. Marvin and Anthony Raul Verduzco

Earlier, in part one of this assessment,* we postulated that a “perfect storm” of socioeconomic forces recently coalesced in Mexico to favor Felipe Calderon Hinojosa, who will represent the National Action Party (PAN) in the 2006 presidential elections.  Those socioeconomic forces are widespread dissatisfaction among Mexico’s productive classes; the declaration of Mexico’s business elite to take a publicly active role in steering their nation’s destiny; and a Papal call to action for Mexico’s bishops to raise their voices in support of societal and political reform.

Another compelling factor, now rising to the fore, strongly favors Calderon’s candidacy: the advent of candidate-centered, issue-driven politics in Mexico, and the corresponding decline in party-dominated elections.  As this trend – already the norm in the United States – takes hold in Mexico, opportunities for Calderon increase at the expense of his more celebrated opponents, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (known in the print media as AMLO) of the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), and Roberto Madrazo Pintado of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI).

The election of Vicente Fox in 2000 shattered both the PRI’s stranglehold on Mexico’s polity and the historical supremacy of one-party politics.  When voters elected Fox they weren’t casting partisan votes for the PAN, as the PRI retained control of the Congress.  Rather, the voters were electing an attractive, seemingly charismatic individual who promised sweeping reforms to Mexico’s political system and government policies.  Yet these promises went largely unfulfilled.

Still, Calderon’s success over Fox’s apparent anointed successor, Santiago Creel Miranda, demonstrates the ascendancy of candidate-centered campaigns.

Despite his current third-place position in presidential polls, Calderon appears to be the only presidential aspirant capable of forming and articulating a coherent vision for Mexico in the 21st century.  Calderon has distinguished himself by advocating a long-overdue program of change for Mexico: political reform, free-market economic solutions, and public safety.  Calderon also appears to be the only candidate capable of uniting the extraordinary numbers of ambitious Mexicans who dream of a better, safer life in the United States; the business magnates who inherently recognize that their participation is essential to an open, prosperous, and democratic society; and the Catholic bishops who want better lives for all Mexicans. 

There are clear parallels between Calderon’s candidacy and recent U.S. political history.  John F. Kennedy, another inherently traditional Roman Catholic, attracted a progressive reputation in the United States when running for president in 1960, largely because his principal competitors – Lyndon Johnson from his own party, and Richard Nixon on the Republican side – were “old school” creations of their respective parties.

Ronald Reagan, inherently conservative and charismatic, won in 1980 (after nearly wresting his party’s nomination from incumbent Gerald Ford four years earlier) by putting a more optimistic and empowering face to the policies that Republican philosophical giant Barry Goldwater propounded 16 years earlier.

And one may conclude that Calderon – another young, passionate Catholic conservative – will increasingly rise above his rivals by advocating progressive, systemic reforms to Mexico’s moribund political and economic status quo, many of which were first proposed by Manuel Clouthier who helped to revivify the PAN in the 1980s.

U.S. political expert Robert Dallek notes that the most successful American presidents have combined a clear political vision, and the ability to compellingly communicate it, with pragmatic savvy that allows for adjustments to a political program as the wants and needs of the body politic dictate.  Abraham Lincoln, for example, maintained his vision of a strong Union most eloquently above all other considerations, including the abolition of slavery.  To do so, he wisely compromised to hold together his wartime coalition by allowing slavery to remain in border states critical to the nation’s survival.  The Emancipation Proclamation – while rightfully enshrined in history – only liberated the slaves of the states in rebellion against the Union.

Ronald Reagan, perhaps the greatest U.S. political communicator since Franklin Delano Roosevelt, was willing to compromise his principles of limited-government with a Democratic Congress to get the defense appropriations he needed to create a bulwark against the menace of the Soviet Union.  When opposition to government-run healthcare – the centerpiece of his political program – proved insurmountable, Bill Clinton maneuvered laterally for more attainable gains.

Moreover, while Lincoln, Reagan and Clinton were each great communicators with strong visions, they also tempered their visions by practicing the art of the possible.  Unsurprisingly all three won historic reelections.

Felipe Calderon decisively trounced Santiago Creel in the PAN’s primaries, winning conclusive majorities in all three – not only because he has a clear program for governing, but because Creel was correctly viewed as "old wine in new bottles.”  In Creel, party members saw another insider’s insider with the perceived ‘dedazo’ of President Fox, a Mexicanism for the near anointing by an incumbent president of his successor.

Lopez Obrador and Madrazo are cut from the same essential cloth: party loyalists offering more of what their parties have historically offered.  If tens of thousands of PAN stalwarts bucked their own sitting president and party apparatus, extending their reach past the executive ‘dedazo’ for a fresh choice, what are millions of ordinary voters likely to do when confronted with two insiders, and a new face with bold ideas?

As Mexican politics become increasingly infused with the electioneering techniques deployed north of the border, two more comparisons with U.S. presidential campaigns are in order.  In U.S. political campaigns, being a clear, early front-runner is an illusory position of strength.  The early front-runner, in both primaries and general elections, becomes a large, bright target for both the media and the opposition.  Being an early favorite gives opponents plenty of free time to craft arguments against the candidate’s policy prescriptions; it allows opposition researchers and media time and opportunities to unearth every last grain of the candidate’s personal and political history, invariably yielding ammunition for unflattering media coverage and avalanches of attack ads; and finally, it gives time for opposition forces to coalesce into a unified front.

An early favorite in primaries is almost never a party's ultimate presidential nominee, whereas an early general election front-runner invariably finds his victory parade turns into a brutal, slogging death march.  If Lopez Obrador believes his early lead in the polls means an easy win on July 2, 2006, he might well find himself learning the painful lessons realized by American "golden boys" like Gary Hart in the 1984 primary; George H.W. Bush in the 1992 general election; or Wesley Clark and Howard Dean in the 2004 primaries.  Even if he is ultimately successful, AMLO faces a year of grinding trench warfare in which no aspect of his personal life or inconsistent political program will go untouched.

Finally, Lopez Obrador and Madrazo, bitter enemies engaged in a political blood feud, face yet another unpleasant surprise brought to them by north-of-the-border campaign trends.  American campaign veterans know that too often such enemies will spend time, treasure, and energies bloodying each other, driving up not only each other’s negatives in the minds of the electorate but also their own – allowing a third, underdog contender to sneak past and take the election.  (The two-party system in the United States makes this largely a primary-election phenomenon, however it also occurs from time to time in general elections – witness Ross Perot’s 1992 grudge match against Bush 41 that sapped enough votes from the sitting President to allow Bill Clinton’s victory.)

In other words, AMLO and Madrazo run the risk of focusing their venom too exclusively on each other, which just might let Calderon – with his passion for Mexico – walk right past them into Los Pinos.

——————————

William J. Marvin is a New York attorney and businessman who follows Mexican politics.  In 1997 Mr. Marvin observed the first-ever mayoral election in Mexico City at the invitation of the Federal Electoral Institute. From 1994-2000, Mr. Marvin was New York Governor George Pataki's personal representative to the Mexican government.

Anthony Raul Verduzco is a principal with Salazar Communications, an Hispanic/Latino marketing and public relations firm with offices in Las Vegas and New York City.  A former Southern California political consultant and businessman, Mr. Verduzco has been involved in a number of international start-up companies.