Monday, April 22, 2013
Drug Cartels and Regional Challenges in Mexico
Stratfor Note: This Security
Weekly assesses the most significant cartel-related developments of the first quarter of 2013 and provides updated profiles
of Mexico's powerful criminal cartels, as well as a forecast for the rest of this year. It's the executive summary
of a more detailed report available to clients of our Mexico Security Monitor service.
Since the late 1980s demise of the Guadalajara cartel,
which controlled drug trade routes into the United States through most of Mexico, Mexican cartels have followed a trend of
fracturing into more geographically compact, regional crime networks. This trend, which we are referring to as "Balkanization,"
has continued for more than two decades and has impacted all of the major cartel groups in Mexico. Indeed the Sinaloa Federation
lost significant assets when the organizations run by Beltran Leyva and Ignacio Coronel split away from it. Los Zetas, currently
the other most powerful cartel in Mexico, was formed when it split off from the Gulf cartel in 2010. Still these two organizations
have fought hard to resist the trend of fracturing and have been able to grow despite being affected by it. This led
to the polarized dynamic observed in 2011 when these two dominant Mexican cartels effectively split Mexican organized crime
in two, with one group composed of Los Zetas and its allies and the other composed of the Sinaloa Federation and its allies.
This trend toward polarization has since been reversed, however, as Balkanization has led to rising regional challenges to both organizations since 2012. Most notable among these is the split between
the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion and the Sinaloa Federation. The Sinaloa Federation continues to struggle with regional crime groups for control in western Chihuahua state, northern Sinaloa state, Jalisco state
and northern Sonora state. Similarly, Los Zetas saw several regional challengers in 2012. Two regional groups saw
sharp increases in their operational capabilities during 2012 and through the first quarter of 2013. These were the Cartel
de Jalisco Nueva Generacion and the Knights Templar.
The Beltran Leyva
Organization provides another example of the regionalization of Mexican organized crime. It has become an umbrella of autonomous,
and in some cases conflicting, groups. Many of the groups that emerged from it control specific geographic areas and fight
among each other largely in isolation from the conflict between Los Zetas and the Sinaloa Federation. Many of these successor
crime groups, such as the Independent Cartel of Acapulco, Los Rojos and Guerreros Unidos are currently fighting for their
own geographic niches. As its name implies, the Independent Cartel of Acapulco mostly acts in Acapulco, while Los Rojos and
Guerreros Unidos mostly act in Morelos state.
The ongoing fragmentation
of Mexican cartels is not likely to reverse, at least not in the next few years. Despite this, while Los Zetas and the
Sinaloa Federation continue to face new rivals and suffer from internal splintering, their resources are not necessarily declining. Neither
criminal organization faces implosion or a substantial decline as a transnational criminal organization as a result of rising
regional challengers. Both Los Zetas and the Sinaloa Federation continue to extend their drug trafficking operations
on a transnational level, increasing both their influence and profits. Still, they will continue to face the new reality, in which they are forced to work with -- or fight -- regional groups.
In Hidalgo state,
a former Zetas stronghold, the Knights Templar have made significant inroads, although violence has not risen to the level of that in the previously mentioned states. Also, the turf war within Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas states between the Gulf cartel
and Los Zetas that began when Los Zetas split from the Gulf cartel in 2010 continues.
In light of Ivan "El Taliban" Velazquez Caballero's dissent from Los Zetas and the death of former leader Heriberto "El Lazca" Lazcano Lazcano,
Zetas leader Miguel "Z-40" Trevino Morales could face organizational integrity issues during 2013. Signs of such
issues appeared in Cancun during the first quarter when some members of Los Zetas reportedly broke from the group and
adopted the Gulf cartel name. Besides possible minor dissent, a seemingly new rival has emerged in Tabasco state to counter Los Zetas. A group called Pueblo Unido Contra la Delincuencia, Spanish for "People United
Against Crime," carried out a series of executions in Tabasco state throughout the first quarter, but the group's origins and significance remain
unclear. No indicators of substantial splintering among Los Zetas have emerged since the Velazquez split.
organizations continued to challenge the Sinaloa Federation on its turf in western Chihuahua state, northern Sinaloa state
and Jalisco state through the first quarter. Intercartel violence in mountainous western Chihuahua continues as the Sinaloa
Federation fights La Linea for control of the region's smuggling routes and drug cultivation areas. Los Mazatlecos so
far has maintained its control over northern Sinaloa cities, such as Los Mochis and Guasave. It also has continued violent
incursions into southern areas of Sinaloa state, such as Mazatlan, Concordia and El Rosario with its ally Los Zetas.
At the beginning
of 2012, Gulf cartel territory appeared likely to be absorbed by larger cartels -- essentially signaling the end of the Gulf
cartel. Support from the Sinaloa Federation and the Knights Templar combined with fractures within Los Zetas allowed a Gulf
cartel resurgence, leading to a renewed Gulf assault on Los Zetas in the northeastern states of Mexico. The resurgence ended
with a series of notable arrests during the last quarter of 2012, such as that of former top leader Jorge Eduardo "El
Coss" Costilla Sanchez. The arrests triggered additional Gulf cartel infighting, which peaked in March 2013.
escalated infighting in the Gulf cartel, particularly in Reynosa, Tamaulipas state, highlighted the new state of the Gulf
cartel: Instead of operating as a cohesive criminal network, the Gulf cartel now consists of factions linked by history and
the Gulf label. The infighting began in 2010 after the death of former top Gulf cartel leader Antonio Ezequiel "Tony
Tormenta" Cardenas Guillen. The death of Cardenas Guillen split the Gulf cartel into two main factions, Los Rojos
and Los Metros. By the first quarter of 2013, infighting had broken out between Los Metros leaders, such as Mario "Pelon"
Ramirez Trevino, David "Metro 4" Salgado and Miguel "El Gringo" Villarreal. This suggests the Gulf cartel
is further fractured and no longer consists of just two opposing sides. The Gulf cartel may begin acting as a cohesive network
during the second quarter after the escalated infighting in March, though this cannot be definitely predicted.
From March 10 to March 19, Reynosa became the focal point for Gulf cartel infighting as Ramirez
Trevino escalated his conflict against Villarreal. Ramirez Trevino reportedly expelled Villarreal's faction
and its allies from the Reynosa plaza and killed Salgado. This could mean Ramirez Trevino has consolidated control over other Gulf cartel factions. If true, this would represent a substantial shift in organized criminal operations
in northeastern Tamaulipas state, where the Sinaloa Federation and the Knights Templar smuggle drugs, people and other illicit
commodities through the border towns of Reynosa and Matamoros while Los Zetas maintain a constant interest in fighting for
control of the stated cities.
As mentioned during the last annual update,
Gulf cartel factions are increasingly reliant on Sinaloa Federation and Knights Templar support to defend the remaining Gulf
cartel territory in Tamaulipas state from Los Zetas. This certainly remains true after the first quarter, although the recent
shift from Gulf cartel infighting may signal a shift in intercartel dynamics. Since the Gulf cartel in reality consists of
separate factions, there is likely a separate relationship between each Gulf cartel faction and the larger criminal organizations
reportedly in alignment with them. With Ramirez Trevino now in charge of Reynosa, a city valued by both the Sinaloa Federation
and the Knights Templar, his existing relationship with the two organizations will likely influence their strategies for maintaining
their interests in Gulf cartel-controlled areas. Additionally, it is not yet clear whether Ramirez Trevino suffered any substantial
losses during the March fighting in Reynosa. If he did lose some capabilities fighting Los Zetas in Tamaulipas state, or if
he has challenged a faction loyal to either the Sinaloa Federation or the Knights Templar, either organization would likely
have to use its own gunmen for defending Gulf cartel-controlled areas or mounting their own incursions into Zetas territory,
particularly Nuevo Laredo.
Intercartel violence in the Gulf cartel-controlled
city of Reynosa will likely diminish compared to the first quarter of 2013 if Ramirez Trevino has indeed won. This
reduction in violence will continue only as long as Ramirez Trevino is able to hold his control over Reynosa. Influence from
external organizations, such as Los Zetas, the Sinaloa Federation and the Knights Templar, could once again spark violence
if Ramirez Trevino's efforts have harmed their trafficking operations through Reynosa or presented a new opportunity to
seize control. What, if any, Gulf cartel infighting is ongoing is difficult to gauge.
Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion
The severing of the
relationship between the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion and the Sinaloa Federation came to the forefront of conflicts
in the Pacific states of Michoacan and Jalisco during the first quarter of 2013. The Sinaloa Federation relied on its alliance with the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion in defending the critical location of Guadalajara from Los Zetas and used the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion as an assault
force into Los Zetas strongholds, such as Veracruz state.
of the rift between the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion and the Sinaloa Federation began to appear in open-source reporting
during the last half of 2012, the conflict between the two organizations only became clear when the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva
Generacion went on the offensive in Jalisco state by attacking Sinaloa Federation allies Los Coroneles, the Knights Templar
and the Gulf cartel.
With a now-fully independent Cartel de Jalisco
Nueva Generacion, the polarization of warring cartels in Mexico has effectively ended. In addition to the existing conflicts
between the Sinaloa Federation and Los Zetas, the Sinaloa Federation must now focus on reclaiming an operational hold over
Jalisco state from the now-rival Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion. The second quarter will continue to see a conflict between
the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion and Sinaloa Federation-aligned groups in Jalisco state as well as neighboring states
The Knights Templar experienced intensified conflict during the first quarter from their principal rival, Cartel
de Jalisco Nueva Generacion. In an effort to combat the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion, the Knights Templar have allied
with other Sinaloa Federation-aligned groups, the Gulf cartel and Los Coroneles, referring to themselves as "Los Aliados"
to fight the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion within Jalisco. Violence as a result of this alliance against the Cartel de
Jalisco Nueva Generacion has been most notable in the Guadalajara metropolitan area as well as towns lying on highways 15
and 90, which connect to Guadalajara.
In addition to the Knights Templar
offensive into Jalisco state, the group is currently defending its stronghold of Michoacan state. The Cartel de
Jalisco Nueva Generacion also has conducted violent assaults against the Knights Templar in Michoacan, particularly on routes
leading from Jalisco state toward Apatzingan, Michoacan state. This assault has increased intercartel violence along the border
of the two states as part of a tit-for-tat dynamic.
Buenavista Tomatlan, Michoacan state, a municipality lying amid territory contested by the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion
and the Knights Templar, have recently set up a community police force to counter Knights Templar operations in the municipality.
As in some other areas of Mexico, this community police force is a volunteer force that assumed law enforcement responsibilities
independent of the Mexican government. The community police, while established to thwart the Knights Templar, have created
tension between the communities of Buenavista Tomatlan and the government. On March 8, the Mexican military detained approximately
34 members of the community police force that had been created in February in Buenavista Tomatlan.
The Buenavista Tomatlan arrests occurred after the community police took over the municipal police station March
4 and detained the municipal police chief, who the Mexican military later freed. Notably, the Mexican government claimed at
least 30 of the detained community police belonged to the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion. If true, this suggests it has
made territorial gains to the point of infiltrating the community police. However, there has been no confirmation on whether
the accusations are true. Regardless, the community police force of Buenavista Tomatlan has placed its focus on stopping Knights
Templar operations in the area, a focus that could only benefit the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion's war with its
"Mexico's Drug War: Balkanization Leads to Regional Challenges," by Tactical Analyst Tristan Reed, was first published in "Security
Weekly" (Apr. 18, 2013), by Stratfor. "Security Weekly" is one of three free publications offered by Stratfor,
a privately owned publisher of geopolitical analysis where analysts use a unique, intel-based approach to study world affairs.
Reprinted with permission.