Monday, June 28, 2010
Some of Mexico's Anti-crime Strategies Finally Defined
By Patrick Corcoran
Earlier this month, Mexican President
Felipe Calderón posted a lengthy defense of his crime policies on the administration’s website. Days later, he followed
that up with a prime-time television address* to the nation that reiterated the written piece's main points.
Calderón started with a thorough
explanation of Mexico's security challenges, and a justification for a forceful government response. In so doing, Calderón
pointed to, among other phenomena, the fracturing of the drug-trafficking industry, gangs’ increasingly ironclad territorial
control of different regions, the weakening of informal agreements governing the industry, and the mutation of smuggling groups
into all-purpose organized crime syndicates.
He followed that analysis with
the five planks of his government's security policies: joint federal and local operations, with citizens participating; improving
security agencies' operational and technological capacity; reforming the legal and institutional framework guiding security
policies; creating a police body that actively prevents crime; and improving international cooperation.
The strategy rollout is welcome,
both for public relations and for policy reasons. Regarding the former, the lack of clarity about Calderón’s goals undermined
public support for government's security operations, because, taken out of context, they seemed haphazard, unproductive, and
even dangerous. This absence of support is especially problematic on security issues, where public solidarity with the
government is vital.
Calderón clearly wanted his 2010 agenda to focus on the
economy first, and security second. To that end, he has downplayed security since last summer, and in the process ceded the
rhetorical playing field to his critics. Consequently, with no one in the government pushing back against Calderón’s
most strident opponents, Mexicans increasingly began to think that they were being left to their fate and that the security situation was beyond the government’s control. Bloody massacres appeared on the front page of the newspapers around the country, but the government rarely (if ever) made
a concerted effort to place the mayhem in context, which made the situation seem ever more chaotic.
From a policy standpoint, Calderón's
communiqué addresses one of his government's principal failures: the absence of a unifying strategy that guides the actions
of all levels of government. In response to the speech, some analysts — namely Jorge Fernández Menéndez — pointed out that Calderón offered nothing new. That's certainly true, but that doesn't mean
it was all unnecessary or without benefit.
Indeed, the fact that Calderón
has spoken so often about crime and we still have nothing like a "Calderón doctrine" organizing the many aspects of the administration's
policy is a reflection of a damaging lack of coherence, something that the president finally began to address.
But while it's good news that
Calderón has evidently recognized the need to reassure his constituents and articulate an outline of his security policy,
the strategy itself leaves too much unanswered. We still don't have an idea of what Mexico's drug trafficking industry is
supposed to look like in Calderón ideal scenario. Does he want an atomized industry with hundreds of small-time smugglers
but no large organizations capable of threatening the state, or does he want one or two hegemonic gangs who help keep order
within the underworld but recognize their weakness relative to the state? And how will he push Mexico in that direction? Without
a sketch of what success looks like, it’s impossible to measure progress and make changes accordingly.
Calderón also neglected to offer
a set of priorities. Limited government resources mean that, rhetoric about a full-on attack notwithstanding, Mexico can’t
simultaneously attack every criminal group with all due force at the same time. So, which groups is the government most intent
on extinguishing first, and why? And which criminal activities, from smuggling to kidnapping to extortion to bribing public
officials, are those that most worry the government?
Calderón also left us without
a timeframe for his strategy. In all fairness, Calderón is not a soothsayer, and predicting the impact of the many ripples
caused by government policy in a hidden industry is a fraught exercise. However, a rough estimate of when Mexico can expect
the strategy to take root is not asking for too much, and this would likewise allow us to more fairly analyze the Calderón
administration's effectiveness in the future.
But despite the shortcomings
of the strategy, its existence is a step forward, albeit a small one. At the very least, now we know where to start when analyzing
the government’s security policy, which is more than one could say a month ago.
* See "Mexican President's
Discourse on the Lack of Law & Order," MexiData.info, June 21, 2010
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Patrick Corcoran (corcoran25@hotmail.com) is a writer who resides in Torreón, Coahuila. He blogs at Gancho (http://www.ganchoblog.blogspot.com/).
