Monday, June 21, 2010
Mexico’s Police Strategies Must Shift to a Terrorism
Model
By Jerry Brewer
Those that are diligently following
the massive violence and escalating carnage in Mexico may have difficulty explaining how something so horrific can occur within
their homeland, but accurately defining it may hold promise and strategic relevance.
We are inundated by the
world media coverage ad nauseam with explanations of drug trafficking organizations versus rival organized elements and their
turf wars for control of drug routes and the demand for drugs. Reports touting
“an explosion of drug violence in Mexico” are a common theme.
President Felipe Calderon says
he won’t relent on the “drug fight,” and blames the United States for its insatiable “addicted”
demand for drugs. However, before hate groups begin to burn the President in
effigy it is critically important to see the credible tactical gains of the military with many genuine security improvements,
and the capture of many individuals of high value.
There certainly was no alternative
of resource other than a well-armed military to combat these narcoterrorists. The
police were never a formidable opponent nor did they possess the skills or physical resources to interdict this enemy that
has morphed into a plain and simple terrorist.
The effectiveness against the
drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), as with terrorists, cannot be measured in the numbers of those combatants killed or
captured, but by the ability to counter the psychological impact and political effects of the battle.
We must all understand
the true definition of terrorism and a terrorist. There are a myriad of ideologies,
contraband, causes, and rationales for terrorism and the subsequent terror that ensues from this mindset. Terror groups are not of a random rise and stand symbol alone. They must have an intent, motive, and common
agenda that unite their members to action. Supplying a demand that brings massive revenue, wealth, and power is not enough
to earn the terrorist label.
The DTOs have graduated
towards achieving political aims and motives using a psychological warfare agenda to instill massive fear and far-reaching
psychological effects beyond the usual rival targets and related victims. The
terror is in the indiscriminate brutality, cruelness, and associated evil of their violent actions. As with terrorists, these non-state combatants attack legitimate governments and seek to destroy and undermine
a political system, its enforcement arm, and a homeland’s way of life.
Helping to analyze the
facts conducive to Mexico’s terrorist model is the current killing spree that has spread throughout Mexico, this irrespective
of drug routes, DTO turf, and routine rival confrontations. One of their common
agendas is in fact the interdiction itself, and all of those perceived to be in support of President Calderon’s “drug
war.” Routine and direct ambushes against military and police are becoming
common operational acts. The narcoterrorists can match the firefight with paramilitary
types of armaments, as well as supersede the enforcement cadre’s weapons in many instances.
Twelve federal officers were
killed in an ambush in mid-June. Armed confrontations against police officers and others claimed several hundred lives last
week alone. In another strange incident, 19 drug addicts were murdered in a rehabilitation
clinic. A newspaper report claimed 96 people were killed in seven Mexican states. Terrorist modi operandi (signatures) are also becoming common practice as there are
an increased number of victims of unusual torture, beheadings, and evisceration.
This enemy that is contained
within no special boundary, border, or jurisdiction is on a full scale rampage, and is not only more than capable of the violent
and murderous onslaught, but is highly motivated and resourced to do so. Police
interdiction and related tactics and strategies are of no moment to this terror model.
Terrorist interdiction
requires the analysis of patterns, trends, the evolving modus operandi and signatures, as well as the intelligence and determinations
of their vulnerabilities. Much like al Qaeda and other Middle Eastern terror
groups, they will not respect symbols of authority such as badges, laws, threats to incarcerate and other police enforcement
methodology. They are war-like, battle hardened, transnational, and have adopted
violent extremism and irregular warfare as their battle plans.
Despite Mexico’s successes
and U.S. cooperation in training, equipment, and other expertise, the effort continues to fall short and significant challenges
remain. Too, the U.S. homeland will continue to face great risk and a persistent
threat to its citizens as these terrorists boldly move to confront any obstacles impeding their agenda. While immigration border issues remain a common topic, neither the Mexican nor U.S. government can ignore
nor afford not to keep a vigilant eye on the ball — which is the high potential for fluid and random attacks.
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Jerry Brewer is C.E.O. of Criminal Justice International Associates, a global risk mitigation firm
headquartered in Miami, Florida. His website is located at www.cjiausa.org.