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Monday, August 3, 2009

Democracy is Being Brought into Question in Mexico

By Barnard R. Thompson

In Mexico, on August 8, the National Action Party, the PAN, will elect a new national president in a process that brings into question the very foundation of today's much touted democracy.  A system of representative democracy that the party had demanded since it was founded in 1939.  An awakening democracy that, after the long fight, is apparently now to be respected by the Panista President of Mexico and his kitchen cabinet apparatchiks only if and when it serves their interests.

 

A history of party principle cast aside as the lone candidate for the PAN presidency, César Nava, was not selected democratically or by unsullied vote in a primary, but with the classic Mexican dedazo – anointed with a figurative finger's touch by President Felipe Calderón.  This notwithstanding subsequent arguments to the contrary.

 

And now comes the ostensible election, called for Saturday, August 8.  A special session of the party's 370 member National Council, at PAN headquarters in Mexico City, where "the registered candidates will be presented to the national council members of the PAN who, compliant with that set forth in the General Statutes, will elect the National President of the Party," according to a statement on the party's website.  Another document adds, "… in order to concluded the 2007-2010 term."

 

Germán Martínez took office as national president of the PAN in December 2007, elected by the National Council in what was then too a single candidate race.  Martínez had long been part of Calderón's innermost circle, and no other Panista wanted to anger the President or to incite vindictiveness by opposing a candidate obviously imposed by Calderón, thus no one else registered and Martínez sweep into office.

 

This in what was also seen as the President of Mexico taking near total control of the party.

 

Martínez succeeded Manuel Espino, a routinely loudmouthed devotee of former President Vicente Fox.  While Espino was president of the PAN he also rose to leadership roles in the Christian democracy movement in Latin America, and today he is both president of the Christian Democrat Organization of America and an ex officio vice president of Centrist Democrat International (CDI), the global political organization that seeks to apply Christian principles to public policy.  Fox is a co-president of CDI.

Germán Martínez took over the reins of PAN with quirt in hand, and an often combative style.  And an autocratic streak that ultimately was part of his undoing – although his feisty nature and heavy-handed party governance would never have been allowed without the approval of Calderón.

 

Indeed, the placement of Martínez was part of a strategy that probably came directly from Los Pinos.

 

In a recent conversation with a longtime member of the PAN, a trusted friend who over the years has served at the highest hierarchical levels of the party, this observer was told by the source (who asked not to be identified) that the Martínez presidency was, in fact, a step along a path that went much further.

 

A three part plan that started with President Calderón, after he took office in December 2006, targeting control over at least two-thirds of the party's National Council members in order to win future votes requiring a "qualified majority."

 

This goal was accomplished in May 2007, at a meeting in León, Guanajuato, with approximately 70 percent of the members of a renewed National Council being Calderonistas.

 

As well, this was the beginning of phase two of the plan, the election of a Calderón stalwart as the new national president of the PAN.  Manuel Espino's term was scheduled to end in March 2008.

 

"(What took place in May) was, of course, noticed by everyone, Felipe Calderón moving to take control of the party," said the aforementioned source.  "And the reaction of Espino was to cut short his term."  Manuel Espino called for the election of a new party president to be moved forward, to December 7, 2007, which was approved by the PAN's 40 member National Executive Committee.

 

Next interested party members were given 30 days to register, however after Martínez submitted his name and resigned from his cabinet post as Secretary of Civil Service (SFP), in late September, no one else registered as a candidate insofar as everyone knew Calderón controlled 70 percent of the National Council.  So, with Martínez subsequently winning the PAN presidency and ascending to said office in December 2007, Calderón had successfully taken over the party and completed part two of the plan.

Step three of the strategy was related to the July 5, 2009 midterm elections for the 500 strong Chamber of Deputies, the lower house of Mexico's bicameral Congress – and by extension presidential plans for the final three years of his presidency.  In order to insure passage of his initiatives, Calderón and his inner circle wanted to make certain that the incoming deputies would be committed to the president, votes that he would be able to count on, and the candidates would be selected accordingly.

"Following consultations with trusted friends, the decision was made in favor of subjugation, not discussion, which is Felipe Calderón's style," according to the source.  "Calderón hears but he does not listen," the person said.

 

And with this democracy flew out the window.

 

During the April 2008 National Convention of the PAN, the party's statutes were amended to allow the National Executive Committee (CEN) to name candidates for elective office when and if there are justifiable reasons or circumstances to do so.  An authorization ceded to the CEN insofar as some electoral districts might not have the needed party structure; maybe they have conflicts with the broader PAN apparatus; or they could be run by local strongmen.

In other words, this process was approved in order to find the best possible candidates in cases when and where the democratic selection process might be inadequate or in question.

A "special circumstance" invoked by Martínez and friends this year in order to name candidates for the 2009 to 2012 Chamber of Deputies.  But not just in those few cases where it might be necessary or justified – no, a total of 402 candidates were selected by the CEN.  For Mexico's 300 electoral districts, 203 people – two-thirds – were designated by dedazo; whereas Mexico City named nearly all of the candidates on the proportional representation (plurinominal) lists for the 200 seats divided among the various parties based on vote percentages.

 

The elections turned out to be a calamity for PAN, a shocking loss, with a considerable amount of the blame tracking back to both Calderón's plan and the dedazos from Mexico City.  These factors in addition to more traditional thinking by some outside observers who point to economic and financial circumstances, insecurity, public safety, unemployment, and other maladies suffered by the people of Mexico today.

 

Of the 500 federal deputy positions, the PAN won only 70 popular election seats, plus 73 proportional representation slots, a total of 143 deputies.  A drop of 63 compared to the outgoing Chamber of Deputies, with the party holding 206 seats until August 31, 2009.

 

On the other hand, the PRI gained 131 deputies with a total of 237 people being elected: 137 by popular vote; 50 plurinominales; and 50 coalition seats in partnership with the Mexican Ecological Green Party.  The outgoing PRI group totals 106 members.

 

The Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) nosedived from 126 deputies in the current Chamber to 71 representatives in the incoming Congress.  And the remaining seats went to Mexico's smaller registered parties.

 

Governors, unicameral state legislatures and municipal presidents were also elected in some states.  Of the six gubernatorial races, five of the six PAN candidates were handpicked by Calderón and/or the CEN, the only exception being Querétaro.  Five of the six lost, with PAN winning only in Sonora.

In Sonora, the tragic June 5 fire at a children's daycare center, with a death toll of 49 children (to date), and Governor Eduardo Bours arrogant, ignorant and politicized poor handling of the aftermath, probably cost not only the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) the state election, but too the aspirations of Bours to become the PRI candidate for the presidency of Mexico in 2012.  Guillermo Padrés apparently won the governorship of Sonora however a group of losing parties, led by the PRI, is challenging the results before Mexico's electoral tribunals.

During the election campaigns of 2009, according to the source, as time went by friends and foes alike asked more and more 'where are the PAN nominees?'  Where were those who would champion the initiatives in the second half of the Calderón administration?

And where is the president who was elected not as a drug war commander, but "as an employment president – and we lose jobs daily; an education president – and now the quality of education is down; a health president – but there are few new clinics; where is the humanist politician?; and where is the human profile of the PAN?; where is the PAN?," the source asked.  Adding, "The images of the President and the party are disfigured by the president's narco strategy."

All of this has caused a great deal of antagonism in the party, my friend went on.  Ill feelings and resentment that were reflected in the July 5 vote for congressional and gubernatorial candidates.  As well, the bitterness is coming to a second head in the run-up to the August 8 intraparty election.

Regarding the July 5 elections, and while prior protests had been made and complaints filed, rather than scandalize the party and the processes PAN members responded to the dedazos with relative silence.  A silence heard loudly as many stayed away from the polls.

Moreover, many of the PAN faithful were greatly disturbed by the attitude and actions of Germán Martínez, blaming him for the party's "loss of self-control."  And with terms like arrogant and annoying, behind closed doors both Martínez and Calderón are held responsible for the party's losses.

"PAN lost, the PRI did not win," has become a repeated condemnation.  As an example, and using a governorship vis-ŕ-vis deputy candidates, one person told this observer that PAN candidate Fernando Elizondo lost the race in Nuevo León because he had been imposed by Mexico City – a huge mistake, the person said.  This because, if Elizondo would have become the PAN gubernatorial candidate through a democratic process he would have almost certainly won the general election.  But the people got mad, they remembered how he became the candidate and who was responsible, and they asked 'why did they do this to us?'  And Elizondo lost.

Soon after the demoralizing losses of July 5 a meeting was held at Los Pinos, with President Calderón having called in high ranking PAN allies who are close to him – including Germán Martínez, who next resigned as national president of the PAN due to the electoral defeats.  And again questions were asked: 'Was this for the good of the party, or was Martínez the sacrificial lamb?'

Whatever the case, whether Martínez had been thrown under the bus or not Calderón was obviously part and parcel of all that had taken place.

On July 13 the National Executive Committee of the PAN called the election for a new party president for August 8, with the resignation of Martínez to take effect immediately thereafter.  And they announced that candidates for the presidency could register between July 15 and July 24.

Parenthetically it should be added that a new round of protests were heard, due to the fact that the party's National Executive Committee, seen as both loyal to and controlled by Calderón (and Martínez), did not also resign.  The resignation of Martínez was thus seen by many as simply for show.

Immediately, when the registration period opened on July 15, 2009, César Nava submitted his name.  César Nava, who had been Calderón's private secretary from the day the president took office to November 25, 2008, when he resigned to seek candidacy in order to run for a seat in the Chamber of Deputies

 

This time the brouhaha went public.

 

Many in the party were angered that the President of Mexico was once again seeking to install his man as president of the National Action Party.  In an effort to insure a democratic process, as a first step a small group of party elders visited Calderón at Los Pinos, however they reportedly got little more than lip service.

 

Next, on July 20, a group of party leaders led by Senators Santiago Creel and Ricardo García Cervantes, and Deputy-elect Javier Corral, met with Calderón and certain of his people for over eight hours to voice opposition to Nava's candidacy.  To boil down the demands of the PAN leaders, they asked Calderón to stay out of the election process for a new party president.  Apparently getting nowhere, along with others they subsequently held a press conference to express their grievances.

 

Again, no other candidates registered.  Yet former Baja California Governor Ernesto Ruffo [1989-1995] – a Mexican icon as the first Panista to break the PRI's gubernatorial domination barrier – offered to run.  There was a caveat however – Ruffo would only run if he could be the sole candidate, to serve until the next regularly scheduled party election in 2010.  Not too democratic, but before related complaints were lodged the offer became a moot point as Nava refused to withdraw his name.

 

And the candidate registration period ended with a single candidate – César Nava.  A single candidate to be elected by a National Council that is at least 70 percent steadfastly loyal to Felipe Calderón.

 

Once more, according to my first mentioned source, the group of party elders went to Calderón, telling him "this cannot happen, your hand must not be in this."  And Calderón reportedly replied that he was not involved, that Nava was acting on his own, "which is ridiculous insofar as (Nava) is Calderón's man."

 

As well, Calderón's statement is contrary to how the system, the establishment, works in Mexico.

 

The source continued, asking, "How do we win the government without losing the party?  Now people are saying, 'we lost the party on July 5; in 2012 we will lose the government.'"

 

"There is a bad feeling within the party," my friend concluded when asked if this would fracture the PAN.  "But no, this will not break the party apart.  The PAN will come through this.  But we will need to change, and this will be done not by the National Council but by the real party members, the many valuable and anonymous Panistas who are worth their weight in gold."

 

As a postscript, during a state visit to Costa Rica on July 29 and 30 Calderón responded as follows to questions regarding his alleged imposition of Nava that were asked by Mexican reporters.

 

"President Felipe Calderón described the accusations by fellow members of his party, regarding the supposed imposition of César Nava in the national leadership of the PAN, as unjust and wrong.  He bemoaned that, due to his friendship with (Nava), it is being said that he is interfering in the internal renewal process for the national leader of PAN.  (Calderón) said he is just another of the council members that will democratically elect the next (party) leader."  (Excerpted from Milenio and Diario de Yucatán, July 31)

 

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Barnard Thompson, editor of MexiData.info, has spent 50 years in Mexico and Latin America, providing multinational clients with actionable intelligence; country and political risk reporting and analysis; and business, lobbying, and problem resolution services.

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César Nava, PAN presidency candidate (Photo: cesarnava.com.mx)