Monday, July 13, 2009

Post-election Change and Political Maneuvering in Mexico

By Patrick Corcoran

When the dust settled on the July 5th midterm elections, there were two big losers and one lucky winner.  Of course, everyone expected the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) to take a plurality in the Chamber of Deputies, but securing a majority (together with the allied Green Party) and watching the PAN (National Action Party) fall well below the 168 seats needed for veto power over the budget was, for PRI supporters, like rich parmesan cheese on top of a delicious plate of pasta.  

Conversely, no one with access to polls expected the PAN to retain its plurality, but the drop from more than 200 deputies to less than 150 was more drastic than even the most pessimistic had predicted. The losses in PAN-friendly areas of Guanajuato, San Luis Potosí, Querétaro, and Mexico State heaped more misery on President Felipe Calderón’s party.

As for the PRD (Party of the Democratic Revolution), the defeats were not as surprising yet its overall loss was more devastating than that of the PAN. It lost more than 40 percent of its representatives, dropping from 127 to around 70 deputies.

After determining the winners and the losers, the focus now turns to the future. Each of the three major parties faces a series of tough questions, whose answers will determine the immediate political path of the country.

First, the PRI: What are the party’s legislative priorities? Mexico needs tax reform like a fireman needs a hose, but beyond that what will the PRI get out of the next three years? Will the party be guided by the wheeler-dealer pragmatism of Manlio Fabio Beltrones in the Senate, or by the more nationalistic economic tendencies of the woman of the moment, party president Beatriz Paredes?

How will the PRI go about pursuing its vision? Does the path to the presidency lie in cooperation with President Calderón, even if that means sharing some legislative victories with the PAN? Or is it in obstruction and gridlock and denying any feathers for Calderón’s cap, thus increasing public dissatisfaction with the PAN?

At a basic level, the vital question is – what is the PRI’s reason for being? Is it a party that has goals for Mexico beyond a Mexico dominated by the PRI?

Now let us turn to the PAN: Why did the party lose? Was it because of horrible circumstances (a global economic crisis and rampant public security problems), or was it an outright rejection of the PAN as it is constituted today?

If it is the latter, are the losses a rejection of Calderón’s version of the PAN, or that of intra-party rivals like Miguel Espino and Vicente Fox? In a related question, will the party remain united behind the executive, or will the sniping of recent weeks become a constant feature of PAN politics as the Calderón presidency eases toward the exit?

What is the path forward? If the loss was a product of circumstance, what can the PAN do to improve its image against a backdrop that may not change a great deal in the next two years? If it was a rejection of the PAN, what are the elements of panismo that need to be altered (religiosity, relationships with business, et cetera) to make the party more attractive to the mainstream?

As well, how much of the agenda will the PAN be willing to cede to the PRI? If the price for fiscal, oil, and labor reform is Beltrones’ congressionally designated cabinet, will that be a price worth paying?

Lastly, the PRD: Was the party’s poor performance due more to its alienation from the majority of Mexicans following the 2006 presidential race, the recent power struggle between former presidential candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador and the party’s national boss Jesús Ortega, or was it due more to a poor campaign orchestrated by Ortega?

What is the immediate future of the PRD? What kind of performance in congress will lead it back to, if not power then national relevance? Will there be any search for common ground with the PAN? Will the PRD hand the structure back to López Obrador’s clique, or will Ortega remain influential despite the loss? Is there any way to unite the constellation of different veins independently pumping the party’s blood?

And what of the inevitable showdown between López Obrador and Mexico City Mayor Marcelo Ebrard, who makes no secret of his intention to run for president in 2012? How long can they coexist? If in 2012 Ebrard faces off against López Obrador, where will the leftist votes fall?

July 5 prompted more questions than it answered. Stay tuned.

——————————

Patrick Corcoran (corcoran25@hotmail.com) is a writer who resides in Torreón, Coahuila.  He blogs at Gancho (http://www.ganchoblog.blogspot.com/).