Monday, February 23, 2009
Is Mexico
Moving towards a State of Failure?
By Sergio
Aguayo Quezada
· The inability of official Mexico to counter the inexorable spread of the country's violent
drug cartels poses a fundamental question, says Sergio Aguayo Quezada
Mexico is increasingly being
characterized as a "failed state" on account of its inability to counter the country's burgeoning problems of drug-trafficking
violence and gangsterism. Felipe Calderón's government denies this charge with indignation.
Who is right?
The notion of a "failed state"
is one of those concepts that arise now and again to try to capture new realities. In this case the term – popularized
by Foreign Policy's annual index – defines states that have lost control over parts of their territory, seen their monopoly over the use of force
diminished, and are incapable of providing adequate public services.
Mexico has been placed in this
category in successive months: by a strategic-analysis report from the United States Joint Forces Command (see Joint Operating Environment 2008, 4 December 2008) [also see MexiData.info], by a leading US business magazine (see Jesse Bogan et al, "The Next Disaster," Forbes, 22 December 2008), and by a succession of journalists (see Joel Kurtzman, "Mexico's Instability is a Real Problem," Wall Street Journal, 16 January 2009).
The Mexican government has reacted
swiftly on each occasion to rebut the accusation. The foreign minister, Patricia Espinosa, for example, spent over an hour
trying to demonstrate with "hard data in hand" that, in spite of its bloody daily toll of victims and incidents, Mexico is
not a failed state (see Adam Thomson, "Mexico rebuffs ‘failed state' claims", Financial Times, 18 January 2009). The attorney-general, Eduardo Medina Mora, likewise responded by reiterating the official version: that the surge of narco (drug) traffickers is owed to the
failures of Mexico's previous rulers.
A desperate bargain
This construction of an alternative
future is the beginning of hope for its architects: its foundation the claim that Felipe Calderón's government is different,
and that – despite all appearances – it is winning a bitter struggle. In order to make good its claim, however,
the government requires two things: the support of the international community (especially that of the United States), and
internal, national unity in its campaign (something it demands and even implores from the Mexican people).
The first requirement was evident
at a somewhat discreet meeting between Felipe Calderón and Barack Obama on 12 January 2009 in Washington. On leaving, Calderón let slip that he had
suggested to the then president-elect that the two governments should "establish a strategic alliance" in order to face mutual
security problems. In other circumstances, Calderón might here be suspected of seeking Washington's recognition of Mexico as the equivalent of a major non-NATO ally (such as Japan, Israel and the Philippines). But this kind of partnership
has not been discussed in Mexico, nor is it on offer. Rather, what is being proposed is a shared acknowledgment of the urgency
of Washington's backing and collaboration in the war against drugs.
The second part of the bargain
is equally hard to deliver. Those of us who live in Mexico suffer the everyday insecurity of this agonizing condition; and,
in my case, start each day hoping the government can give good news on the battlefront. But it is hard, and not only because
of the drug-gangs whose violence took 5,400 lives in 2008: the governors and big businessmen who bend and break rules, and even the street-vendors
who steal electricity, also diminish the capacity to govern. This government indeed is living with the consequences of a difficult
inheritance, but its own incoherence, misjudgment and inability to tell a convincing story to the people worsens the situation.
When Mexican citizens observe the state rocking like a boat in choppy waters, even the most hopeful begin to lose heart.
A realistic answer
There are differences within
any government, but it is the leader who must control them. Since the domestic "war on drugs" began, two of the main departmental
heads (Genaro García Luna, minister of public security, and Eduardo Medina Mora, attorney-general) have been locked in a dialogue of the deaf;
while Mexico's head of national security is pursuing his own course, contradicting the aforementioned official version in
the process.
An important moment in this respect
was the breakfast meeting convened on 27 November 2008 by the defense secretary, Guillermo Galván Galván, with a group of communications specialists. The analyst Leonardo Curzio, who was present, summarized for me the essence of Galván's comments: that Mexico's internal security is at grave
risk because the army is being worn down by the omnipresent drug-cartels, because the much-sought cooperation with regional governors and municipal presidents (especially some
affiliated with the Partido Revolucionario Institucional [PRI]) is not being achieved, and because Felipe Calderón does not pursue those politicians alleged to protect or tolerate
drug-lords.
The message is credible; there
is more than enough evidence to support the case that the executive is submissive before the authorities that wield de facto
power in Mexico (see Sam Quinones, "State of War," Foreign Policy, March-April 2009).
An especially surreal example
is that of Elba Esther Gordillo, who is at the helm of three powerful ships at the same time: the teachers' union (with one million members); a political party (Nueva Alianza), which has shown sustained growth; and a growing number
of public offices to which she appoints and removes people at will. La Maestra (as Gordillo is known colloquially) was a key
figure in the contested electoral victory of Calderón in July 2006, and it seems that the favor she delivered then is still being rewarded:
for example, the president changed the head of the national lottery – a government agency with a multi-million peso budget – simply because La Maestra wished it so.
Is Mexico, then, a "failed" state?
In general terms, the answer
must be no – if only because the state still controls most of its territory. However, the situation becomes less clear
if the actual, close working of cities and institutions are examined: here, the state's presence is often notional, as those
who control the power-strings are the narcos. The government of Felipe Calderón is disoriented and passive in face of the
corruption, inequality and impunity that bleed and debilitate society and the state. The feeling that we are marching towards
a precipice is accentuated.
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Sergio
Aguayo Quezada is a professor at the Center of International Studies, El Colegio de México. Among his books is 1968:
Los archivos de la violencia (Grijalbo/ Reforma, 1998). His website is http://www.sergioaguayo.org. This article was originally published by Sergio Aguayo Quezada and openDemocracy.net (02/17/09) under a Creative Commons license.
This article was translated by
Alfonsina Peñaloza
