Monday, December 1, 2008

Futile to Expect an Overnight End to Mexico's Crime War

By Patrick Corcoran

Looking at Mexico’s security policy is like navigating a river: to figure out where you’re going, you can't focus only on the bend just ahead. Instead, you must view the river from a great distance, eying everything from the mouth to the headwaters all at once. 

That's why the just expired 100-day deadline for an improvement to Mexican security was so silly.

First, a little background: Following the outpouring of anger in August about the kidnapping and murder of 14-year-old Fernando Martí, representatives of every level of government, unions, the Church, business, the media, and civil society all signed an agreement endorsing dozens of changes that would ideally make it easier to combat insecurity. Despite the long-term projection of many of the provisions, various media outlets set a countdown of 100 days so that, to borrow Excelsior’s vague formulation, “the authorities that signed the agreement for legality and justice keep the promises that they made.”

Since then, security improved in certain parts of the country; in others it worsened. Improvements in security, such as they were, were just as likely indicative of one drug gang consolidating its control than adjustments stemming from the pact. Likewise, surges in violence were not likely the product of a surge in police corruption, but rather the internal dynamics of the drug trade. Whatever the case, the past 100 days were little more than a two-mile meander in the Amazon. 

During the last 100 days, Torreón, where I live, bore witness to the arrest of dozens of its police officers, alleged to be working for the Zetas. For days afterward, local police refused to patrol. Machinegun battles have become a semi-regular occurrence. As unsettling as all that has been, the army and federal police presence over the past three months brought some measure of calm to what had been an increasingly anarchic city, and law enforcement took apart a prolific kidnapping group operating here.

So did the security improve or worsen? You could make an airtight case either way.

The same dichotomy prevails across Mexico. September bore witness to narco-terrorism in Morelia, but two months later, Operación Limpieza uncovered what is probably the most consequential nexus between drug cartels and public officials in the nation’s history, which, embarrassing though it may be, marks an improvement over several months ago in that the corruption has now been uncovered. Wherever you go, the state of security is subject to debate.

Two separate but related elements of Mexico's drug trade cloud the immediate reality, making it impossible to measure near-term success or failure, and all but scream for patience and moderation. The first is the fact that the most decisive players, i.e. the cartel leaders, operate hidden from public view. Their perceptions and intentions are unknown to the public. Does the recent peace and quiet in one city mean that it is already divvied up, or is one group merely biding its time and resources before making a violent play for the plaza? Will an escalation in violence send every cartel to the mattresses, or is it an opening for a pact that will reduce the bloodshed? We never know until after the fact.

The second element is the law of unintended consequences. This exists to a certain degree for every governmental action, but in Mexico said consequences don’t mimic the tranquil ripples in a lake disturbed so much as the violent caroms of a pinball machine.

The arrest of Gulf Cartel leader Osiel Cárdenas in 2003 is a perfect example; instead of being a huge step forward, it precipitated the ascendance of the Zetas to the leadership of the cartel, which has generated unprecedented levels of violence in Mexico.

Media outlets that focused on the 100 days gave voice to a very understandable frustration with government impotence, but not every crime is a result of the government’s failings. To think that giving the governmental agencies a good scolding and a thorough scrubbing was going to translate into a tangible improvement in people's lives in such a short time span was unrealistic.

The nation's security problems are so entrenched that all it can do in the short term is hammer out a long-term strategy acceptable to all, and establish some baseline tactics to help you get there – and then to continually refine its approach. This is essentially what the pact tries to do, but it’s going to take a lot longer than 100 days to know if it’s working.

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Patrick Corcoran is a writer who resides in Torreón, Coahuila.  He blogs at Gancho.