Monday, November 10, 2008
Juan
Camilo Mouriño (RIP) and Energy Reform in Mexico
By George
Baker
It is a shock for the Mexican political system –
and for me personally – to face the death of the 37-year-old Interior Minister (and de facto vice president) of Mexico
owing to a bizarre airplane crash – not in a remote site in the Sierra Tarahumara mountains of Chihuahua, but on a main
boulevard in Mexico City and just a few miles from the national airport (and yet fewer miles to the Presidential Residence).
In Mexico, it is always important to try to distinguish
between events and meta-events. The
latter are message-events intended to convey a message to one or multiple public or private constituencies. Given the pattern
of assassinations of top police officials in 2008, especially of those connected to President Felipe Calderon's anti-drug
campaign, it was immediately imaginable that the airplane crash in which this official and others, plus pedestrians and motorists,
died was an assassination (hence, meta-event), not a mere accident (event).
The Interior Ministry manages one of the four intelligence
agencies of the government (CISEN), and the ministry was involved in the planning of the government's security and anti-drug
efforts. Assassinating the interior minister would be a message that no one in the government who opposed the narcos
was safe.
There is much about Mr. Mouriño that is not in
the public record: What is known is that he was born in Madrid, the son of a Spanish father (and, he said, a Mexican
mother). In Mexico, he was a child of privilege, owing to his family's lucrative contracts with Pemex in the State of Campeche.
He obtained a BA in economics from the University of Tampa, with subsequent graduate work in accounting at the University
of Campeche.
In 2000, he was elected a federal congressman,
and, without prior experience (except for that of his family's business) was named to head the Energy Commission of the Chamber
of Deputies.
It is not in the public record when he became part of the inner circle of Felipe Calderón, but, when
Mr. Calderón was appointed Energy Minister in September 2003 (after the hapless Ernesto Martins), Mr. Mouriño followed him
to the ministry as an advisor. In 2004, he was appointed Under Secretary for Electricity.
He left the Ministry four months after Mr. Calderón
was dismissed in May of 2004 (technically, Mr. Calderón resigned on May 31). Briefly, he was Acting Secretary of Energy prior
to the nomination of Fernando Elizondo.
Mr. Mouriño became the executive coordinator of
the then-underdog campaign of Mr. Calderón to be the PAN presidential candidate, and later the coordinator of the PAN presidential
campaign with Mr. Calderón as the candidate.
Mr. Mouriño was campaign coordinator in the spring
of 2006 when I had lunch with him and Ernesto Cordero (who also had served in the Energy Ministry with Mr. Calderón, as Under
Secretary for Planning, and who would later be appointed to a cabinet ministry in the government). The lunch, at the
Suntory Restaurant near the World Trade Center in Mexico City, was arranged by Ricardo Silva, a Pemex platform contractor
from Jalisco.
The conversation, which was in Spanish, revolved
around the issues that a Calderón administration should pay attention to in the energy sector. I recall few details beyond
that of my emphasizing the importance of developing a strategy for deepwater and cross-border oilfields. He and Ernesto expressed
interest in these topics, but they revealed little of what was on their minds in the way of policy. As is usual from
such encounters, there was little or no follow-up. I sent emails to him, but never received a reply.
After the election
on July 2, Mr. Mouriño became the head of the Calderón Transition Team. The September 26, 2006 issue of Poder y Negocios
featured the photograph of the strikingly handsome Mr. Mouriño on the cover, and he was described as the leader of Calderón's
kinder (all young) of advisors and the person who would likely be the strong man
in the next administration.
For the first two years of the Calderón administration,
he was the chief of staff of the President, and then head of the Office of the President, substituting for Francisco Acuña,
the former governor of Jalisco. He served just ten months in this position.
As the Interior Ministry is the official body of
the executive branch that communicates with the Congress, all policy initiatives passed across his desk. It was rumored that
he was the intellectual author of the Calderón energy reforms. Mr. Mouriño came under attack by Andrés Manuel López
Obrador, who accused him of enriching his family business by arranging improper contracts with Pemex when he was a congressman
and later when he was in the energy ministry (La Jornada, Feb. 28, 2008; NYT, March 15, 2008).
At the time of his death Mr. Mouriño was working
to achieve a PAN majority in the Lower House of Congress from the elections scheduled for July 5, 2009. One line of speculation
is that the reforms that were not passed in 2008 might be possible with a PAN-majority Lower House during the 2009-12 legislative
period.
Mr. Mouriño's energy legacy is mixed: The energy
reforms of 2008 are likely to benefit those service companies that, already, have lucrative contracts with Pemex. The reform
of Article 33 of the Federal Administration Law provides that the Energy Ministry will submit to the Foreign Ministry (SRE)
proposals for agreements and treaties for cross-border oilfields.
But neither Mr. Calderón nor Mr. Mouriño took up
the heavy lifting of insisting – despite the populist rhetoric to the contrary – that the Mexican Constitution
is neutral about the role of oil companies in Mexico. It is the Petroleum Law of 1958 that invents – without constitutional
foundation – the notion that payment for the activities of exploration and production cannot be made as a percentage
of production, a concept that was clearly stated in Articles 8 of the Petroleum Law of 1941.
Nor did either one, in the design of the Pemex
Law of 2008, propose any measure that would fix the dysfunctional organization of the upstream subsidiary. In practice,
as the oil companies have learned, combining the function of exploration with that of production is a great mistake.
True, the Transitional Articles hint that there may be an important restructuring ahead in relation to the subsidiaries, but
such a hint is no substitute for recognizing in the Senate Energy Forum that there are serious problems in Pemex Exploration
& Production (PEP) – starting with the flawed logic of its very existence.
Finally, it was a big policy defeat for the Calderón
administration not to prevail over the trucking lobby of Pemex jobbers (including the Mouriño family business Grupo Energético
del Sureste).
Given the demonstrated skill with which Pemex, over the years, has kept the federal government in the dark
about the degree to which Pemex is not in alignment with international practices, it is likely that Mr. Mouriño died unaware
of the real reforms that are needed in Pemex and the energy sector.
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George Baker is the director of Energia.com, a publishing and consulting firm based in Houston. He
can be reached via e-mail at g.baker@energia.com.