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Column 061608 Brewer

Monday, June 16, 2008

Intelligence Confusion Inhibits a Collaborative Process

 

By Jerry Brewer

 

The absolute necessity for sound intelligence collection and processing is a critical component for assessing threat. The Americas, in particular, can greatly benefit from effective and efficient application of fundamentally sound practitioners tasked to collect, process, and report necessary data. The inherent problems in the art of intelligence gathering precede Biblical times and remain to this day. The problems, among many, are in confusion and the lack of appropriate sharing of collected data for proactive purposes.

 

The "confusion" element actually conflicts with the word "fusion," which in intelligence circles (and the concept of "Intelligence Fusion Centers") is the meticulous process of managing the flow of information and intelligence across all levels and sectors of government, as well as private industry. The primary focus of these fusion centers is the process through which information is "collected, integrated, evaluated, analyzed, and disseminated."

 

Nations attempting to work together to interdict common threats that transcend national borders are also faced with regimes that control the intelligence process in oppressive ways as a powerbase to perform evil deeds. Venezuela's President Hugo Chavez, who has adopted the communist Cuban "DGI" style of intelligence, recently overhauled Venezuela's intelligence process. The two main intelligence services, the DIM (military intelligence agency) and the DISIP (secret police), will be replaced with the General Intelligence Office and General Counterintelligence Office. These are to be under the direct control of President Hugo Chavez. Chavez's efforts are described as those to "assert greater control over public institutions in the face of political challenges." Chavez was defeated last December in a proposed package of constitutional changes that would have expanded his powers. Chavez declared that this would not "dampen his ambitions to transform Venezuela into a Socialist state."

 

Much confusion about intelligence, in what has been traditionally described as cloak and dagger and shrouded in intense secrecy, conjures up the vision and ideas of assassins, coup d’état scenarios, and other sinister behaviors. A proactive intelligence process of competent democratic nations engaging in collection efforts regarding transnational terrorism and organized criminals can thwart threats from destabilizing democratically elected governments. Too, the process includes the interdiction efforts to prevent illegal narcotics production, illicit trafficking in arms and humans, and the proliferation of WMD, their precursors, and delivery systems.

 

Mexico is a prime example of a critical need for sound intelligence gathering to fight the savage drug war that has engulfed the country, as well as the U.S. border.

 

The U.S. Patriot Act, although criticized due to much misunderstanding, remains an antiterrorism tool that has enhanced the ability to secure a homeland. The ability to monitor communications of suspected individuals that "indicate association" to terrorism has resulted in the capture and dismantling of terrorists and terror plots in cities around the globe. This vital antiterrorism tool contrasts with Venezuela's new intelligence overhaul. Theirs’ authorizes "any special or technically designed method" to intercept and obtain information. This appears to be purely Cuban-style policy.

 

A monumental task for domestic intelligence gathering within the homeland is to seek out, detect, disrupt, and dismantle terrorist sleeper cells before they can commit an operational act or attack. Much of this must be accomplished by focusing collection efforts on suspected recruiting, terrorist training, fundraising, and logistical support. The collection efforts require the capability to quickly ascertain the reliability, implications and details of terrorist threats and to improve the capacity to disseminate threat-related information to local, state and federal agencies. The next problem for those at the local levels is to operationally understand the complexities of terrorist modus operandi.

 

Challenges must be confronted before they mature into direct threats. This necessitates broad cooperation of partner nations, as well as continuing to strengthen existing relationships, to provide the appropriate amount of security across a broad spectrum facing peaceful nations within the region. Tactics, techniques, and procedures must be continually enhanced to meet the fluid nature of a changing strategy by terrorists to defeat methods in place to interdict them. Their reactions to a non-unified effort against them results in the enabling of their movement to hide and sustain themselves with ease.

 

Within the U.S. homeland "Fusion Centers" were put in place as a collaborative effort between intelligence organizations and law enforcement, in an effort to share intelligence and counterterrorism information. However, in what has been described as "an absence of a widespread domestic terrorist threat," the Centers face undue scrutiny as to their value. The argument essentially is that there is "not enough terrorist activity to justify multi-jurisdictional and multi-governmental level fusion centers."

 

The threats of terrorism and associated violence and death to the south of our border require our utmost attention, planning, readiness and reaction. Being proactive, as well as strategic, requires situational awareness of these real threats.

 

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Jerry Brewer, the Vice President of Criminal Justice International Associates, a global risk mitigation firm headquartered in Miami, Florida, is a guest columnist with MexiData.info.